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The topic of spatial cognition has many potential connections with 
problems in contemporary society. Just ask those around you how and 
with what degree of difficulty they determine directions or visualize 
a scene. You will discover that there are similarities and differ-
ences among the reports you receive, but always that the reports are 
emotionally tinged with degrees of pride or embarrassment. 
I hope and feel that the research contained herein will serve to 
illuminate the processes involved in spatial cognition. The following 
people were instrumental in allowing me to take part 1n what has been 
a joy and a curse: My parents, who provided support of.every imagin-
able kind; my adviser, Dr. Bob Weber, who exhibited infinite patience 
with my bumbling ways; my committee members, Dr. Bob Stanners and Dr. 
Larry Brown, who provided sound editing and valuable insight into my 
written efforts; Clyde Wolford, who spent infinite hours in construct-
ing successive laboratories and in arguing with me 
spatial cognition; and, last but not least, 
a better way. 
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How do people know where they are and where things are around 
them? The implication from a psychological point of view is that they 
form a mental representation of the environment that is available for 
consultation. 
The study of mental maps has had a long and discontinuous his-
tory. At the turn of this century, a few scientists were concerned 
with how people know in which direction distant cities and countries 
lay. With the advent of modern quantitative methods, spatial cog-
nition was studied in the laboratory through the administration of 
paper and pencil tests. 
Since the cognitive revolution in modern psychology, there has 
been a plethora of research demonstrating the scope and speed of non-
verbal thought processes. But it has been only within the past five 
years that comprehensive theories of spatial cognition have been ad-
vanced. Each of these topics will be reviewed in this thesis, in 
preparation for the presentation of a study designed to represent a 






Prior to World War I the majority of experimental investigations 
of human spatial cognition were concerned with describing the psycho-
logical processes underlying geographical orientation. Trowbridge 
(1913) asked subjects to mark on a circular sheet of paper the direc-
tions and distances of various near and far locations with respect to 
their own position. He found that the majority of his subjects ex-
hibited marked misconceptions concerning the locations of international 
cities, and many of these subjects appeared to have rotated an imagi-
nary map of the world, producing constant errors in all direction 
estimates but correct conceptions of the distances to and between 
cities. The errors of other subjects did not appear to be so regular, 
but instead seemed to depend upon the subject's familiarity with the 
area of testing, or even the direction in which he faced at the time 
of testing. 
Trowbridge (1913) argued from such results for the existence of 
two "radically different" styles of orienteering. The first group 
seemed to be alone in determining directions by consulting mental maps 
which, in conjunction with the adoption of an abstract reference sys-
tem such as knowledge of compass directions, allows a powerful way of 
navigating through unknown territory. However, such a method of 
orientation also has disadvantages in that improper assignment of 
cardinal directions to the map will result in its rotation and subse-
quently gross disorientation. The second group did not possess the 
mental map and instead, determined local directions by directly asso-
ciating known landmarks to distant points. As long as the location of 
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the landmark is known, orientation was mainLaincd. The mcchunism of 
orientation is obscure but probably involves the recollection of the 
motor movements necessary to face a given point in the home territory 
(Gregg, 1939). Obviously, such a system is useless 1n an unknown area. 
Thus, those subjects in Trowbridge's experiment who exhibited more ran-
dom error probably were used to orientating themselves with respect to 
familiar landmarks which did not exist in the testing area. 
Trowbridge termed the method of orientation that used an abstract 
reference system as being egocentric and the method using concrete 
landmarks as domicentric, although as Howard and Templeton (1966) 
point out, the term geocentric is preferred to egocentric. Later, re-
searchers (Angyal,· 1930; Claparede, 1924) confirmed the fact that there 
seem to be two styles of orientation, although they did not adopt 
Trowbridge's characterization of one's being civilized and one not. 
Specifically, they found both that some subjects determined directions 
without referring to.the orientation of their physical body and that 
some did. The former correspond to those subjects in Trowbridge's 
study who consulted imaginary maps while the latter presumably did not 
access such an aerial-view type map, but instead may have imagined 
their environment as seen from ground level --a much more "egocentric" 
(Trowbridge's domicentric) perspective. These subjects then would 
probably be less prone to make errors concerning near locations (assum-
ing they were cognizant of their whereabouts), but more so with distant 
locations due to a lack of a large-scale cognitive map. 
This distinction between styles of orienteering was approached by 
Ryan and Ryan (1940) from a phenomenological viewpoint. They asked 
subjects to verbalize processes as they determined directions of 
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cities and found evidence for at least three kinds of orientation. 
First, subjects could visualize the scene beyond the obstruction of the 
laboratory wall as if the wall were removed. As the authors note: 
One of the simplest and commonest, and at the same 
time one of the most difficult to understand from the 
point of view of ordinary accounts of psychological ac-
tivity is what we shall call 'prima~y directionaliza-
tion.' Here the relation of the 'here and now' to other 
places is inherent in the present apprehended scene (p. 
207). 
Second, subjects could deduce directions by assigning verbal labels to 
landmarks. Here primary directionalization accounted for the accessing 
of the location of landmarks but compass directions were determined 
from the names associated with the landmarks (i.e., west hill). The 
third type of orientation involved the subject's seemingly scanning an 
imaginary aerial map of the surrounding area. 
Geographical Orientation -- Conclusions 
This research indicates the existence both of general processes 
and wide individual differences involved in the act of geographical 
orientation. People seem to determine directions of distant points on 
the earth by generating one or more of the following mental products. 
First, they can directly associate landmarks with unseen locations. 
Orientation is determined through recalling motor actions necessary to 
physically face the scene. Subjective experience probably involves a 
high degree of nonvisualization of the desired scene. Second, one .can 
consult an imaginary map that contains the orientation and location of 
points in a symbolic, although quasi-spatial, framework. After the 
person determines his own orientation via referring to landmarks~ he 
can determine the location of points by simply scanning the map. Some 
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subjects may prefer to rotate the map so that its "north" corresponds 
to true geographic north. Finally, people may prefer neither to visu-
alize nor scan a mental map, but simply to determine directions either 
by recalling propositional statements or associations about the relation 
of seen landmarks with unseen points. 
Psychometric Research on 
Human Intelligence 
Following the Second World War, factor analytic research method-
ologies enabled a more precise v1ew of the processes underlying the 
introspections of the Ryan and Ryan (1940) subjects. Pioneers in the 
field had already established that spatial abilities were at least as 
important to general intelligence as verbal and performance abilities 
(Spearman, 1927; Thorndike, 1921; Thurstone, 1938), but the factor was 
diffuse and the tests for it appeared dissimilar. Gradually, evidence 
for two, and sometimes three, sub-factors appeared (Fruchter, 1954). 
The sub-factor most commonly agreed upon, spatial visualization, re-
ferred to the ability to imagine or project the positions of a group 
of objects after having undergone a prescribed rearrangement. An ex-
ample would be to visualize the movements of the internal parts of a 
machine. A test loading high on this sub-factor, Punched Halls (1962), 
required the subjedt to decide if the holes in a flat sheet of paper 
would line up after the paper was folded along certain axes. In Figure 
1, the correct answer is (d). 
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Figure 1. Test Item From Punched Holes Test 
The second factor, spatial orientation (sometimes called spatial 
orientation-relations to include a third and indistinct sub-factor), 
emphasized the general ability to determine the arrangement of an ob-
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ject or group of objects with respect to one's own bodily position. In 
this case, the object array would undergo no more complicated a trans-
formation than a change in appearance as if it were being viewed from 
another perspective. A test of this is Spatial (Ships) Orientation 
(1947), where two pictures, each containing the prow of a boat and a 
shoreline in the distance, are presented side by side. The subjects' 
task in this case is to decide which direction the boat has turned from 
the first to the second scene by selecting the change in background. 
In Figure 2, if the background is represented by the circle and the 
boat by the rectangle, the corect answer is D. 
Although there is general agreement on the validity of two abili-
ties or factors involved in spatial cognition, there is some argument 
as to exact definitions of them, or even whether they both should be 
considered spatial factors at all (as opposed to more general abili-
ties). Michael, Zimmerman, and Guilford (1950, p. 190), hypothesized 














manipulate objects within an array, while spatial orientation had to 
do with the ability to "comprehend the arrangement of elements within 
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a stimulus pattern, previously with reference to the human body." They 
note that this ability would allow one to note whether one object array 
was or was not the same--but rotated-- version of another array. In 
other words, an implication of this ability is to be able to visualize 
a scene as if one had changed position in space or if it had rotated. 
Michael et al. further postulated that whether one or the other ability 
was used, depended upon task complexity and the predisposition of the 
subject. Complex tasks requiring successive manipulation of an array, 
obviously would require the visualization factor as defined. On the 
other hand, if the tasks were simple enough to solve by noting if an 
array had undergone rotation, then spatial orientation would be ade-
quate. However, some subjects might solve the rotation by manipulating 
a representation of it in successive increments, an indication of 
spatial visualization. Likewise, some subjects might solve a complex 
task by projecting themselves into the mental or visual representa-
tion (i.e., imagine that they are folding a piece of paper to see if 
the holes match). Although not iron-clad, the crucial distinction be-
tween the two operations seem to be whether the object array is 
represented as if it were seen in real life from a close or far visual 
point of reference. A crucial factor in which perspective is adopted 
is the nature of the object array represented as well as the complex-
ity of the transformation, not to mention the subject's habitual means 
of solving spatial tasks and his general intelligence. 
8 
The complexity in this view of the differences between the two 
spatial factors led Smith (1964) to treat spatial visualization as the 
sole spatial ability, while spatial orientation arose from nonspatial 
sources. In this view, visualization is defined as the general ability 
to "retain and recognize (or reproduce) a configuration as an organized 
whole" (p. 62). The orientation factor gives rise to the ability to 
manipulate that representation. The obvious difference between this 
view and the previous one is the shift in assigning manipulative prop-
erties from the visualization to orientation factors. This view is 
generally upheld by Cattell (1971) and Pawlik (1966). 
Until such time as there is some agreement on the nature of the 
abilities associated with the two spatial factors, research on the 
subject of spatial cognition is likely to be a thorny and confusing 
subject. Two recent articles on the genetics of spatial cognition 
should serve to illustrate the problem. Vandenburg (1969, p. 389) 
administered several tests of spatial abilities to pairs of twins, and 
concluded that "· .• it would seem that the perception of form and of 
perspective show a higher and more consistent tendency to have a 
significant hereditary component than do tests which require the 
ability to move objects around in one's mind." 
Here, based upon the definitions of the two spatial factors, it 
seems that it is spatial orientation that seems to demonstrate an in-
herited component, only because of the emphasis upon knowledge of 
perspectives, which requires a knowledge of egocentive position. Yet, 
in his article summary, Vandenburg rephrases his conclusions: 
The results from this study suggest that it is 
mainly form perception, or the ability to keep a 
pattern or drawing in mind, as much as mental rota-
tion required in some spatial visualization tests, 
which is determined, in pa:r~t, by heredity (p. 293). 
Here, again, based upon the two-factor distinction, it appears as if 
visualization and not orientation is genetically determined. Mental 
rotation of objects is a manipulative process removed from considera-
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tion of the person's egocenter (to some degree) and could be indicative 
of visualization as much as orientation. In the second study in ques-
tion, Yen (1975) first reclassified the findings of Vandenburg and 
others in terms of visualization and orientation, and concluded that it 
is orientation that exhibits a genetic influence. Yen then admini-
stered four tests that supposedly measured 2- and 3-D visualization and 
orientation to a male-female population in an attempt to discover sex-
linked genetic influences upon spatial ability. To measure 3-D orien-
tation, Yen chose Vandenberg's (1973) paper and pencil version of the 
Shepard-Metzler (1971) task of mental rotation of 3-D objects. She 
found no evidence for a sex-linked influence, which, based on the pre-
v1ous analysis of mental rotation, is not surprising, for the task is 
not a measure of spatial orientation as defined by the research of 
Michael and his associates. 
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This type of research will obviously not advance until the com-
ponents of spatial cognition are more clearly demonstrated. Although 
there is general agreement that there are at least two distinct opera-
tions occurring in ·these tasks, there is some agreement that the 
visualization operation is closely related to general intelligence. 
There is no agreement upon the nature of the second operation. Some 
suggest that it has to do with cognitive style, some with general ma-
nipulative facility. Others (Hart and Moore, 1973) suggest that it has 
to do with the developmental ability to coordinate perspective .. At 
this point, the most reasonable research strategy might be to cease 
attempting to explain the nature of the factor, and instead, isolate 
some more of its parameters, such as who uses it, under what conditions, 
and is it necessary for all spatial tasks. The experiment advanced in 
this thesis is, in fact, an attempt toward that aim. 
Psychometric Research - Conclusions 
Two abilities have been found to be associated with spatial cog-
nition. One, spatial visualization, refers to the ability to generate, 
and perhaps maintain, an imaginal representation of an object array. 
It seems most app~opriate whenever the object array consists of a group 
of objects which must undergo a series of transformations. The second, 
commonly known as spatial orientation, underlies the ability to generate 
a view of an object array from a different perspective. The object ar-
ray here usually undergoes the simple transformation of rotation in 
space. The distinction between the two factors is not clear-cut. Many 
spatial tasks require both of them to some degree, and therefore, they 
may .or may not ever act in an additive fashion depending upon the nature 
of the task. The experiment described in thi.s thesis should demon-
strate some of those effects and interactions. 
The study of spatial cognition to this point has moved from the 
field to the laboratory with some consistent findings. In solving 
spatial tasks, most people seem to rely heavily upon the generation 
and manipulation of imaginal representations of external objects. 
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People seem to differ as to whether or not the self is inherent in that 
representation, and that fact has consequences upon the manner and speed 
in which the tasks are solved. They also differ in their use of verbal 
formula in solving the tasks. Thus, the study of spatial cognition 
should consider both aptitude and individual differences in subjects 
in order to attain some degree of comprehensiveness. 
Contemporary Research 
With the coming of modern cognitive psychology, reaction time 
methodologies, and the likening,of human thought to the functioning of 
computers, came yet another perspective on spatial cognition. Roger 
Shepard and his colleagues at Stanford, ln a series of elegant experi--
ments, provided dramatic evidence that the transformation of mental 
representations of external objects occurs in a continuous fashion--
suggesting, to them at least, that " • all thinking by humans, and 
other animals, is basically analogical" (Metzler and Shepard, 1974, p. 
226). The importance of their research to this discussion lies more 
with the notion that the reaction-time methodology employed provides a 
springboard from which the operations involved in spatial cognition can 
be defined with greater precision. 
In one study, Shepard and Feng (1972) found .that the time which 
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subjects took to determine what a flat piece of paper would look like 
after it was folded in a certain prescribed manner linearally in-
creased with number of folds. One is immediately struck by the simi-
larity between this task and the test of Punched Holes described earli-
er. The authors used this finding to argue for analogical processes. 
It also serves to show that visualization can be studied with a 
reaction-time technique. 
Shepard's work is more often associated with his demonostration of 
mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler, 1971). Here, subjects first 
viewed a picture of an abstract 3-D object, followed by a second pic-
ture of either the same object from a different perspective or its 
mirror image. Reaction time to decide whether or not the first and 
second pictures depicted the same object was found to be near perfect 
linear function of the degree of angular difference between them. As 
discussed earlier, the task of mental rotation of a fixed object array 
seems to require the enactment of both of the operations of spatial 
orientation and visualization. 
What seems to be missing is a demonstration of the operation of 
orientation alone. 
What would such an experiment be like? First of all, the object 
array should be large, probably simulating the natural environment to 
aid the· imagination of those who would treat the task as an abstract 
one. A scene resembling that in the test of Ships Orientation comes 
to mind. Using the Shepard paradigm, the obvious task would be to 
present the two pictures depicting a boat's prow and changing shore-
line in succession. The time to decide should increase with the degree 
in which the boat is suggested to "turn." The interpretation of such 
I 
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results would resemble the general line taken by Shepard; that is, of 
a mental rotation. But in this case, just exactly what is rotated 1s 
not exactly clear. Is it the entire object array or is it one's own 
imagined body? The idea of rotation of the body seems more plausible 
in that it would probably require less cognitive effort (an effect of 
a qualitatively different kind discussed earlier). Rock (1973). 1n his 
discussion of the effects of orientation on form perception and the 
apparent paradox of retinal and environmental rotation would appear to 
agree: 
I would suggest that visualizing a figure in a 
different orientation from the one it is in occurs 
literally by rotating the figure in one's imagination 
by degrees until it has arrived at the desired orien-
tation, or by visualizing the transformations the 
figure would undergo in its egocentric appearance as 
one turns by degrees until one arrives at the desired 
cirientation. [Of the two visualizing the self turn-
ing seems easier and more natural to me] (p. 72). 
The basic idea could be extended to most any environment by photograph-
ing it in successive increments about a central axis, resembling-what 
one would see if one were to slowly turn around. 
Such a study entails a few difficulties. A nice linear reaction 
time through 180 degrees of angular departure is improbable due to the 
fact that people can determine what is Qehind them and to the side as 
fast or faster than what is 1n front of them (personal communication, 
Clyde Wolford). The reason probably has to do with the natural asym-
metry of the body and its influence upon the organization of cognitive 
space. The implication, rather, is that evidence for such mental ro-
tation would have to be gathered in a more indirect fashion. Hochberg 
and Gellman (1977) have recently approached this subject although in an 
abstract fashion. They presented subjects with 2-D figures, asking 
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them if they were rotated versions of previously presented figures or 
different figures entirely. Some of the figures contained information 
about orientation that was easily discernible while the same information 
in other figures took more searching to extract •. Linear functions be-
tween angle departure of the first and second figures and reaction time 
such as Shepard obtained were suggested only for the data for the fig-
ures with disguised cues to orientation. The implication is that a 
holistic mental rotation seems necessary when a sequential mental com-
parison of features is ruled out or is cumbersome. (This mental rota-
tion of an object would seem to possess components of both orientation 
and visualization, not being a clear example of either one as defined 
by Michael et al. [1957]). These findings suggest that in our hypo-
thetical study concerning mental rotation and real-life environments, 
what Hochberg and Gellman (after Lynch, 1960) call landmarks may have 
an important effect on mental operations in spatial cognition. By pro-
viding cues_to orientation, they may obviate the necessity to determine 
orientation solely by a holistic mental rotation of the imagined body, 
and instead, facilitate the scanning of a mental representation map. 
As it will be recalled from Ryan and·Ryan's work on geographical 
orientation, the locations of points is determined through a variety of 
means, including visualization of scenes, verbal formula, and the scan-
ning of a cognitive map. Both factor-analytic and modern cognitive 
research has illustrated some of the parameters of visualization and 
its attendant operation of spatial orientation. Recent research also 
exists that sheds some light upon the operation of mental scanning of 
visual representations. Kosselyn (1973, 1914) asked subjects to focus 
i 
their attention upon a certain feature of an imagined object (the 
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headlight of a car) and then asked them to verify the existence of an-
other feature that had a high probability of belonging to that repre-
sentation (a door handle). The time which subjects took to decide 
whether their representation contained the appropriate feature in-
creased as a linear function of the distance between the corresponding 
features of a typical "real" car. Apparently, subjects were scanning 
an internal representation much as one would visually scan a physical 
object.· As did Shepard, Kosselyn used such research to argue for the 
existence of continuous mental operations utilizing more or less ho-
listic mental representations, i.e., an analog view of cognition. 
Conclusions and Directions for 
Future Research 
Research on spatial cognition of the environment and factor ana-
lytic research on spatial cognition of idealized objects both pointed 
to the existence of at least two major factors; what we refer to here 
as spatial visualization and orientation. The visualization factor 
has been convincingly demonstrated bythe work of Shepard and his as-
sociates, while the orientation faqtor has been neglected. An indica-
tion that this gap ln knowledge may soon be rectified is forthcoming 
from such theories as Neisser (1976), who has called for such research 
to resume using object arrays that resemble the environment rather than 
the ideal objects used in the laboratory. 
Kosselyn (1974) has provided a study that seems representative of 
the type of research that is needed. Working with a developmental 
framework, he gave children and adults practice in placing objects at 
pre-designated points on the floor of a life-sized experimental space, 
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across which were hung either transparent or opaque sheets. It was 
found that subsequent estimations of the distances between pairs of ob-
Jects from memory increased as a result of the intervention of both 
types of barriers for children (ages 4-5), while only the opaque bar-
riers had such an effect for adults. The conclusion was that the 
children's representations of the experimental space were forced to 
become "compartmentalized" due to the barriers, and the. same was true 
for adults, but to a lesser degree. That the opaque barrier effect was 
due to a deficiency in visualization.capacity is suggested by the fact 
that being able to see through the transparent barriers allowed normal 
estimations for adults. However, the methodology does not allow one to 
consider the possibility that the effect might have been due to a lack 
of ability to represent views of a perspective different than the one 
in view. In other words, the two operations inherent in spatial cog-
nition were not adequately partitioned to account for respective main 
and interaction effects between the twin spatial factors of visualiza-
tion and orientation. The methodology contained in this research is an 
attempt toward- the separation of those two factors in spatial cognition. 
Individual Differences in 
Spatial Cognition 
To complete this discussion on research, some mention should be 
given to recent indications of the great individual differenfes operat-
ing in spatial cqgnition. 
With regard to the Shepard task and mental rotation in general, 
Hock and Ross (1975) have discovered that the time to mentally rotate a 
dot pattern was decreased by pre-exposing the patterns to the subjects. 
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However, the effect only existed for those subjects who could quickly 
discern if a pattern was symmetrical or not. Hock and Ross argued that 
these "structural" subjects, as opposed to the other "analytic" sub-
jects, typically process information in a more holistic manner. The 
fact that there seems to be such striking individual differences with 
respect to mental rotation seems to join with the notion inherent in 
the literature on spatial cognition that some subjects tend to adopt 
similar preferences for either of the operations of visualization or 
orientation. In other words, Hock and Ross's structural subjects may 
have been performing the mental rotation operation much in the same 
egocentive style as those subjects who projected their body image into 
the boats in the Ship's Orientation task. The analytic subjects, how-
ever, as evidenced by the stimulus prefamiliarization non-effect, seemed 
to be performing the task in a qualitatively different fashion, perhaps 
utilizing verbal formula, or at least not enacting orientation opera-
tions. 
Sex differences also seem to be important. Research has consist-
ently pointed to the fact that men invariably out-perform women on 
tests for spatial ability (Fruchter, 1954; Smith, 1966; Fairweather, 
1976), although some research has not determined the locus of the mas-
culine advantage. Allen (1974) found results directly applicable to 
the present study. Men scored higher on all tests of spatial ability 
except those that we can classify as measures of spatial visualization 
and men were most superior on tests of spatial orientation. On the 
b~sis of strategies subjects reported using in solving the tasks, 
Allen hypothesized that females were less efficient in this regard; 
often adopting an abstract approach to a difficult problem, failing and 
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substituting a very concrete strategy in its place. The results show 
that women performed nearly as well as men on the more abstract tests 
of spatial visualization and that the male superiority (or female de-
ficit) was primarily on the test of orientation--a more concrete test. 
Allen, however, did not classify her tests on this dimension and there-
. fore, was unable to make any conclusions regarding her research. How-
ever, in terms of the twin-factor distinction, the suggestion is that 
women tend to adopt the visualization factor to the exclusion of the 
orientation factor. 
Contemporary Theories of 
Spatial Cognition 
Until very recently, there existed no reasonably comprehensive 
theory of spatial cognition. In the last five years, two theorists, 
one from the school of thought emphasizing discrete, propositional 
memory representations, and the other emphasizing holistic, imaginal 
representations, have offered computer simulation models of human 
spatial cognition. 
Minsky's (1975) model rests upon the fundamental assumption that 
man possesses a cognitive structure that is alterable by.experience, 
and in turn, guides behavior. This view bears obvious resemblance to 
the schema theories of Bartett (1938) and Piaget (1967, 1971). Minsky's 
theory is an improvement, however, in that it breaks the schema into 
components which allows study of the nature of internal representations 
of discrete events or objects. Minsky has developed a unit of analysis 
called a frame. A frame represents a rather large chunk of information, 
much larger than the chunks which cognitive psychologists are used to 
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dealing. In terms of spatial cognition, a frame would represent the 
visual information one has acquired about all possible views of.an ob-
ject array. Using the representation of a house as an example, the 
views that one has.of the four walls of a room in the house might be 
considered to be represented in one frame. The individual views are 
called view frames. Other rooms would, of course, be registered in 
other frames, and these frames could be grouped into larger frame sys-
tems according to section of the house, function, etc. These frames 
are thought of being arranged in the intersections (nodes) of a network 
of connecting links. This network of frames is itself a frame called 
the Global Spatial.Frame (GSF) ·and represents the skeleton spatial ar-
rangement of objects in a large scene of geographical area. It might 
be considered analogous to an overhead view or cognitive map of an 
area. 
A search through memory for the location of an unseen or occluded 
object takes place along connecting links of the GSF. The links con-
tain information about how the frames are arranged in external reality 
(that frame is behind and to the left of this frame, etc.). When the 
higher frame has been found in the GSF, then particular Vlew frames can 
be enacted and translated into concrete visual imagery. 
The two-factor distinction is readily apparent in the discussion 
of the functions of the GSF and view frames. The GSF contains infor-
mation about the arrangement of object arrays with respect to one 
another, while view frames contain information about the orientation of 
the objects with respect to the subject's position. The crucial dis-
tinction, as with visualization and orientation, is whether or not the 
position of the subject is inherent in the information provided by the 
operation. 
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This theory does allow us to make some predictions as to the time 
it would take to generate various views of the interior of a house. 
Since the views of walls of each room are represented in distinct 
frames, which themselves are linked by associative pathways, it should 
take longer to generate views of walls in rooms further from one's po-
sition (or referent point) than in some section of the house (nearer 
to one's position or referent point). Although this prediction has not 
been tested, Kosselyn' s research on the scanning of visual im·ages would 
seem to support it. It is also possible to hypothesize about the time 
it would take to generate view frames. Based on earlier discussion of 
the orientation operation as the locus of individual differences, it 
may be that some subjects may differ in the time they take to generate 
view frames of an object that requires a change in perspective, i.e., 
to visualize the opposite side of the wall. Kosselyn's study (1974) 
discussed earlier confirms this prediction on a developmental level, 
in that children had more difficulty in estimating the distance between 
objects separated by barriers. 
Kosselyn (1977) has put forth another computer simulation model 
of spatial cognition. The main feature is his treatment of images as 
surface products of deep structure transformation, much as is popular 
in linguistic theory. The deep structure representation of an object 
consists in Kosselyn's model of two types of storage files. One type 
contains iconic material about the appearance of the object. This 
type of file also always contains information about the overall or 
global appearance of the object. The other type of file stores pro-
positional statements describing the relationship between the object 
and other objects con~ained in separate storage files. Image 
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generation takes place as a series of operations which shift about and 
transform the contents of these files. First, somehow the appropriate 
global image file is accessed .in memory and transformed into a visual 
image. (Kosselyn uses the metaphor of a computer program generating 
images on a cathode ray tube, as in a .complex television set). Details 
of this image are then filled ln as more lCOnlc files are transformed. 
Objects associated with the first object are then accessed based on the 
information contained in the proposition files associated with the first 
object, until the image is complete. Besides image generation, Kosselyn 
points out that the location and distance of objects can be determined 
via a process of "zooming" and "scanning" in which imagined attentional 
space is devoted to successive parts of a global image until the sought 
for part lS found. Thus, although based upon entirely different pro-
cesses, Kosselyn's model also predicts longer times to generate distant 
objects. Kosselyn also notes that an expected prediction of his model 
would hold that it should be difficult to add details to a global image 
generated in a non-standard orientation. The reason is that the oper-
ations sending iconic material to the rotated image displayed on the 
surface "screen" would have to accomplish some fairly complex pattern 
recognition before it could be matched properly. The recognition pro-
cess at every step of the way would seem to be very uneconomical. 
Thus, the operations of visualization and orientation seem to re-
assert themselves in the model too. The generation and scanning of 
images takes time such as would a visual search of the corresponding 
real-life scene. It also takes longer to deal with views of an object 
requiring a shift in egocentric perspective. Kosselyn's model also 
provides a new slant on this second operation. Because details are 
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not quickly forthcoming for non-standard views, then for subjects re-
lying heavily upon concrete imagery it should take even longer to 
generate or make decisions concerning views of this type of environments 
that are homogeneous rather than distinctive. There does not seem to 
be any research to address itself to such a prediction, although some 
will be forthcoming here. 
General Conclusions 
Two theories of spatial cognition seem to be in agreement on the 
basic applications involved in generating information about distant ob-
jects in the environment. The further the object is from the obser-
ver's objective position in space, the more time should be required to 
generate an image of it. If the image is stored or accessed in a per-
spective differing from the observer's current one, then even more time 
should be required to generate it. This last prediction however may 
not hold true across all subjects due to individual differences asso-




A reaction time methodology is proposed that is designed to 
identify the mental operations involved in spatial cognition of an en-
vironmental array. It is predicted that the time to visualize desig-
nated walls of a house varies according to task and subject parameters. 
Specifically, it should take longer. to visualize a wall hypothesized to 
be represented in a different frame (room) from the wall in the current 
visual scerie (same room). Analysis of the walls of a house, 1n terms 
of frame theory (Minsky, 1975), suggests that walls within a room should 
be considered to be represented and accessed together. Therefore, 
given that one is viewing a wall within a house, it should take sig-
nificantly longer to generate or determine views of the walls· of the 
room just on the other side of that wall than it does to determine 
walls of the room in which one is currently "in." 
Qualitative differences in· representation should also have effect 
on reaction time. For some subjects, it should take longer to deter-
mine views of walls which require a change in visual perspective from 
the one inherent in the given visual scene. Thus, .it should take more 
time for some subjects to generate views of the other side of a wall 
than the far wall of the next room due to the fact that they may have 
difficulty in imagining a mental rotation of the body., Other sub-
jects, not lacking this deficiency, may require equal amounts of time 
23 
to generate each of these extra-room views, or even less time to gen-
erate the view of the other side of the wall they are looking at, be,... 
cause they are adept at the mental rotation operation. 
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These formulations have the assumption that the person would 
perform such a task by imagining himself as being within the house and 
mentally traveling through walls and turning around, etc. It is equal-
ly conceivable that people might imagine the house as from a bird's-eye 
perspective. In this case one would simply scan the house, taking more 
time to generate information about walls as they exist further from a 
referent point or wall. The existence or absence of an orientation 
operation would not seem to come into play here. It may be possible 
to correlate performance on such tasks with preformance on tests of the 
two abilities associated with spatial ability, orientation and visuali-
zation. 
To test these hypotheses, a miniature (3 feet square) representa-
tion of a four-roomed house was constructed, the rooms being arranged 
in a square as indicated ln Figure 3 (a more detailed diagram is shown 
in Appendix A). 
There are formally possible three "views" of interest that one 
can generate of the walls within the "dollhouse." Given that one was 
looking at Wall S (for stimulus wall) from within room 1 at position P, 
then one could determine the wall one would see if his body were turned 
180°, or what we will call the "Reverse" view (Wall R). One could also 
determine the wall one would see if one suddenly acquired x-ray vision 
(Wall X). This is, quite appropriately, the "x-ray view." Finally, 
one could determine the wall one would see if one were to pass through 
WallS and then turned around (Wall 0). This is the "opposite" view. 
R( " p ~s p )X 
~ 
Figure 3. Schematic Diagram of 
a "Dollhouse" 
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Based on frame theory, the walls of a room should be represented 
together. It should thus take longer to generate the x-ray (X) and op-
posite (0) views than the reverse (R) view. In addition, for some 
subjects, it should·take longer to generate non-standard views (0) than 
standard views (X), because 0 requires the enactment of two operations, 
"walking through the wall" aud "turning around," while X requires 
"walking through the wall" only. Sa~d in another way, some subjects· 
may possess little ability to perform mental perspective change and 
thus take much longer to generate the 0 from the X v1ews. On the other 
hand, some subjects may be able to shift perspectives quite adequately 
in addition to being able to visualize a complex scene. These subjects 
might be able to scan the "dollhouse" as from a bird's-eye aerial per-
spective ~d since the x-ray wall would be farther from the stem wall 
' 
than the opposite wall, these subjects should take longer to scan to 
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the X than to the 0 wall. This prediction would hold true even if they 
imagined themselves within the dollhouse. A third group of subjects, 
possessing little power of visualization (and presumably orientation), 
should perform the spatial task in a non-spatial manner or via direct 
association, yielding no appreciable differences between x-ray and op-
posite. 
The tests for orientation and visualization were administered in 
the hopes that they would allow prediction of the above RT patterns. 
The specific predictions would be that subjects scoring low on the test 
of orientation would take longer to generate the extra-room wall re-
quiring a perspective change (0) than the extra-room view not requiring 
that mental operation (X). Subjects scoring high on the orientation 
test would be able to enact the perspective change quickly and thus 
take longer to generate X than 0 simply because X is further from the 
referent wall. A third group of subjects should show no appreciable 
differences between X and 0 due to their reliance upon verbal associa-
tions to perform the task. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 32 students (16 males and 16 females) enrolled 
in Introductory Psychology courses at Oklahoma State University. 
Apparatus 
Two random access slide projectors were used to present stimuli 
onto a rear projection screen. Mounted below the screen was a stimulus 
27 
cue device designed to light up the words "X-RAY," "OPPOSITE," "RE-
VERSE," and "IDENTITY." Another cue device presented the words 
"CORRECT" and "INCORRECT." stimulus.events and data storage were con-
trolled by a 1800 E Automated Data Sy$tems process control computer. 
Materials 
Subjects viewed an experimental space designed to resemble a 
house. The "dollhouse" consisted of four rooms each measuring 17 
inches on a side and all arranged into a square house, in the pattern 
of Figure 3. The walls of each room were of a different color and the 
furniture was constructed from cardboard and spare parts. Stimuli were 
photographic color slides of each wall taken from ground level, with 
the field of view being taken completely up by the entire wall and not 
containing any part of the adjacent walls. 
Procedure 
Instructions read to subjects are included ln Appendix B. 
Subjects were allowed to view the contents of each room for two 
minutes. Each room was covered by a removable lid and no two rooms 
were ever exposed to a subject at once. During the two-minute interval, 
subjects were instructed to view each wall of each room, standing di-
rectly in front of it, for 30 seconds to ensure homogeneous representa-
tions and visual perspectives of the dollhouse. After the viewing 
time was over, the room was covered with the lid, and E tapped on the 
lids of the rooms by each wall, asking the subjects to recall a unique 
feature of each wall. If the subjects could not recall a wall, then 
the lid to that room was removed momentarily to allow another look 
within. Errors to the criterion of perfect recall were recorded for 
each subject. 
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Subjects were then taken to the ma1n laboratory. There the E 
presented 4 x 6 color photographs of the walls of the dollhouse to each 
subject, and he/she was asked to point to the corresponding location of 
the wall on a schematic diagram of the dollhouse. Errors were re-
corded, and if the subject could not correct an error or if he/she com-
mitted more than three initial errors, he/she reviewed the actual 
dollhouse. 
Subjects were then informed that there were three "views" with 
respect to the dollhouse that were of interest: x-ray, opposite, and 
reverse. If the subject indicated that he/she understood the views, 
then all of the photographs of the walls of the dollhouse were laid in 
front of him/her and he/she was asked to pick up the appropriate one 
when the E pointed to a photograph and asked for one of the views. 
Errors were recorded. 
The sequence of events of the experimental session for each sub-
ject was as follows. The subject was seated in front of a table upon 
which was a reaction-time switch that could be thrown to indicate a 
"yes" or "no" decision, a back projection screen, and two random-access 
projectors. The structure of a single trial is shown in Figure 4. A 
cue light projecting either the letter "X," "0," or 11R" (or "I," to be 
explained), informed the subject that he/she was free to begin a trial 
and that that particular view was needed. The subject was then free to 
depress a foot-switch which caused a slide of an interior wall of the 
dollhouse to appear on the screen. When the subject felt that he/she 
knew or had generated the appropriate view, the foot was removed from 
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the foot-switch, at which point the time that the foot-switch was de-
pressed was recorded. This served to define the viewing time (RTl) 
for slide 1. This act also caused a second slide, either of the cor-
rect view or another wall of the room containing the correct view, to 
appear on the screen. A throw of the response switch to either "cor-
rect" or "incorrect" removed that slide from the screen and recorded 
the amount of time it was visible (RT2). The subject repeated this 
process for 64 trials (16 per four conditions), which exhausted all 
possible slide pair combinations, both true and false, for all four 
conditions or views (remembering that only the 8 walls facing out of 
the dollhouse have X, 0 and R views). The order of conditions was ran-
dom, with the restriction that no view appeared three times in succes-
sion. 
Sti~lus Stimul s 
events ~ light 











actions~ foot-switch foot-switch 
.5 sec. ITI 
f Throw 
hand-switch 
Figure 4. Events Within a Single Trial 
The identity condition was added as a baseline indicator; the 
task was to decide whether or not the second slide was the same as the 
first. There were also 16 warmup trials at the start of both day's 
testing which included four trials from each task. 
Subjects were administered printed tests for those operations 
thought to be most relevant to this task: spatial orientation and 
spatial.visualization. Presentation order of the tests was random 
across subjects. The tests of Ship's Orientation and Punched Holes 
referred to earlier were used. 
Design 
30 
Analysis of the data proceeded along three fronts. First, the ef-
fects of four factors upon each of the dependent variables of RTl and 
RT2 were analyzed. Those factors were composed of three levels of Task 
(X, 0, and R), two levels of Sex, two levels of Days tested, and two 
levels of Sessions per day. Second, an attempt was made to predict RTl 
for each of the three tasks from the scores subjects made on each of 
the two tests administered to each subject (Punched Holes and Ship's 
Orientation), in addition to errors made in learning the dollhouse, 
identifying the slides of the walls of the dollhouse, and learning the 
tasks. This called for a multiple step-wise regression analysis for 
predicting RT from various pre-experimental measures of ability and per-
formance •. Table 1 illustrates more clearly the variables involved in 
this analysis and the phase of the study in which they were monitored. 
Last, subjects were divided into three groups, depending on 
whether their means on RTl for the two tasks exhibited the following 
response time relationships over both days of testing: 1) R < X(. 0, or 
2) R < 0 <X. The third possibility was the case where the relationship 
between X and 0 were inconsistent or neglible, 3) R = X = 0. Subjects 
in the first group (RXO) were hypothesized not to be preferentially 
utilizing the orientation operation while those in the second group 
TABLE I 
DATA MATRIX OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Day 1 
Phase 1 
Errors in determining geographical orientation S's 
.;.... ____ _ 
Phase 2 
Errors in identifying walls by recalling items S's 
of furniture 
Phase 3 
Errors in identifying slides 
Phase 4 
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(ROX) were. Subjects in the last group might have been relying on non-
spatial processes. To test these notions a discriminant function 
analysis was performed in order to discover whether subjects in any 
group score differentially higher on one or more of the tests. It was 
thought that group one (above) would score relatively lower on the test 
of orientation than group two. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
General Findings - AOV 
Dollhouse/task learnings are contained in Appendix C. 
An analysis of variance for RTl, excluding the identify condition, 
is summarized in Appendix D. Plots of Rl task means (including Iden-
tity) over four sessions are in Figure 5. Session and marginal task 
means for RTl and RT2 are shown in Appendix E. The high significance 
of Session and Day factors reflect expected learning effects. A 
planned comparison of the task factor revealed that the average mean of 
X-ray and Opposite combined was significantly greater than Reverse 
[T(32) = 2.87, p ( .005]. The planned comparison of Opposite and 
X-ray proved non-significant [T(32) = .60, p) .05]. The only sig-
nificant :interaction was for Sex by Session, and not of theoretical 
interest. With regard to Sex differences, it is interesting to note 
that Opposite exceeded X-ray over all four sessions for males, while 
the reverse arrangement was true for females (all non-significant at 
p').05). 
Analysis of variance for RT2 (excluding Identity) is summarized 
in Appendix F. A plot of task means (including Identity) over sess1ons 
is included in Figure 6. Tukey's post-hoc analysis of the task factor 
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Figure 6. Plot of RT2 Task Means Over Four Sessions 
[T(60) = 5.34, p < .05]. ·Simple main effects analysis of the Task 
factor showed significance for Task at Session 2 [F(2,60) = 4.31, 
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p < .01]. Post-hoc analysis indicated significance differences be-
tween Opposite and X-ray [T(60) = 3.71, p < .05], and Opposite andRe-
verse [T(60) = 3.32, p < .05]. 
It should be noted that these means for RTl and RT2 are pooled 
over correct rejection and correct acceptance choices. Data points not 
falling within maximum and minimum cut-off criteria (Appendix G), or 
falling within two standard deviations from the subject's Task per.ses-
sion RT mean of the remaining data, were removed from consideration. 
This usually meant removing one or two data points per Task per Ses-
sion, and considering an equivalent number of errors (Appendix H), this 
left an average of twelve data points on which to base Task means. An 
analysis of error scores revealed no significant Task differences (Ap-
pendix I). 
General Findings - Correlations 
Correlations among RTl Tasks (Reverse, X-ray and Opposite), doll-
house/Task learning phases, and tests of Visualization and Orientation 
are contained in Table II. The inter-Task correlations were high and 
virtually identical. The test of Visualization, and not Orientation, 
bore moderate negative correlations with all Tasks. 
Both tests correlated, from high to low, with Reverse, Opposite, 
and X-ray. The r for Orientation and Reverse is significantly greater 
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Subjects' data were then classified into three ad hoc groups, de-
pending upon whether, for at least three out of four sessions, the mean 
for Opposite exceeded X-ray (Group 1, n = 14), X-ray exceeded Opposite 
(Group 2, n = 11), or there was no agreement for three sessions (Group 
3,n=7). 
A discriminant function analysis of group membership based upon 
test scores revealed relatively no predictive validity for the above 
criteria. The prediction function eigenvalue for the test of Orienta-
tion was .03 [)[(4) = 1.4, p > .05], and for the test of Visualization, 
• 02 [X ( 1) = • 44, p > . 05 J. 
Task-test correlations of the three groups are shown in Table III. 
The test of Visualization only bears significant correlations with all 
three tasks for Group 1, while the test of Orientation alone does so 
for Group 2. 
Group 1 OSX 
n = 14 
X-ray 
Oppo~ i tt.• 
Or-ientation 
Vi:;ualizali.on 
Group ~-\ 0 
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There were two classes of hypotheses: one having to do with 
general operations in spatial cognition, the other dealing with in-
dividual differences, both of which were at least partially supported. 
First, it was predicted that subjects would take more time to 
generate, from memory, information about walls of the dollhouse that 
were not physically visible from a referent point (X-ray, Opposite) 
than about walls that were (Reverse). The rationale for such a pre-
diction seems to follow from current models of spatial cognition which 
emphasize longer retrieval times for information about scenes that are 
represented in different rather than similar "frames" (Minsky, 1975). 
Frames should, in this case, correspond directly with representations 
of the four walls of a room. The finding that it takes significantly 
longer to generate (RTl) extra-room views (X, 0) than the same room 
walls (R) firmly supports this notion. 
No predictions had been made for RT 2 Task means. The fact that 
the Task means generally mimiced RTl suggests that the double reaction-
time technique is not perfect in separating out experimental and de-
cision Task components. 
Previous researchers on spatial cognition emphasized an individual 
difference view of spatial cognition, contending that there were 
several mental operations involved in solving a spatial task and that 
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they could be utilized in differing proportions by different people. 
Michael et al. (1957) discovered psychometric evidence for two maln 
spatial operations: Orientation, which referred to the ability to 
imagine an object array from different perspectives, and Visualization, 
which referred to the general ability to hold or manipulate in one's 
mind the image of an object array. With respect to these tasks, the 
X-ray viewer does not require a perspective change while the Opposite 
and Reverse do. Thus any individual differences should be linked.to 
differential performance on these two classes of Tasks. Current models 
of spatial cognition do not explicitly postulate separate spatial oper-
ations, probably because both experimentally and theoretically, the 
notion has been debated (Smith, 1964; Pawlik, 1966). These data, how-
ever, unambiguously indicate wide individual differences with respect 
to these Tasks. First of all, there were 14 subjects who regularly 
took significantly more time to generate the Opposite than the X-ray 
view, while another 11 subjects indicated the Reverse tendency. Second, 
Lhe correlational patterns of these two groups were markedly different, 
although unexplainably so. Due to the small n sizes of the groups, 
conclusions must be postponed in lieu of further research. But it is 
clear that a comprehensive theory of spatial cognition will have to 
account for the very substantial individual differences. 
Whatever conclusions that may be drawn from the attempt to inte-
grate psychometric tests of spatial cognition with information-
processing Tasks, it is clear that, from the low Task-test correla-
tions, the two are tapping different cognitive components. At least 
from the results of this experiment, Carroll's (1976) hope of "forging 
a link between psychometric data and cognitive information processing 
theory" (p. 28), may not be soon forthcoming. 
In summary, these data indicate the usefulness of a particular 
information-processing methodology for the study of mental operations 
involved in the cognition of real-world spatial scenes. 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS UPON LEARNING 
THE DOLLHOUSE 
1. E ascertains that subject is aware of polar coordinates and loca-
tions of landmarks about the campus. Errors in noting the correct 
orientation will be recorded and corrected. 
2. E reads instructions: 
"This is an experiment investigating the general question of 
what psychological processes are involved in learning one's environ-
ment, or more generally; how does one know where he is and where 
things are around him or·her. 
In order to do this we have constructed a miniature represen-
tation of a four-roomed house, each room being covered by removable 
lid. I will remove each lid in turn during which you will have two 
minutes to inspect the room within. After looking at all four rooms 
you will be shown pictures of each of the walls of the dollhouse and 
asked which wall in which room they show. After we are sure that 
you have learned the dollhouse, you will be asked to perform 1n an 
experiment in which the task involves viewing pictures of two walls 
and making a quick decision as to where one wall is in relation to 
the other. So it is not so important that you remember every piece 
of furniture in a room, but rather be able to remember the 
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arrangement of the walls of the dollhouse while looking at pic-
tures of them." 
3. E continues with instructions: 
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"Please stand by the dollhouse here (E points). When I lift 
the first lid you should begin your inspection. You will have two 
minutes per room. Every 30 seconds I will indicate that you should 
move to the next slide of the dollhouse where you will continue 
viewing the same room from another angle." 
4. E removes the first lid and identifies the room as per kitchen, 
study, LR, or BR. 
5. After the subject has viewed all four rooms, the experimenter asks 
him/her to name an identifying feature on each wall as the ex-
perimenter indicates them at random by tapping the roof of the 
dollhouse. When all the walls are correctly identified by this 
method, phase 1 is completed. Errors are recorded for each subject. 
If there is an error within a room, the subject is allowed to re-
view the room associated with the error immediately for 30 seconds. 
Phase 3 (Slide Identification) 
1. E places a schematic diagram representing an aerial v1ew of the 
dollhouse before the subject and asks him to point to the appro-
priate wall as photographs of each wall are placed before the 
subject. This process continues until the subject correctly 
identifies each photograph. Errors will be recorded and photographs 
associated with errors will be shown again until all are correctly 
identified. 
Phase 4 (Familiarization with 
the Task) 
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"As I mentioned earlier the experimental task involves viewing 
pairs of slides of the walls of the house and determining if they bear 
a certain relationship. If you will look at the diagram I will explain 
what those relationships are. If, after looking at the wall in front 
of you, you turned around or reversed your position by 180 degrees you 
would of course be facing the wall behind you. Now, if you were again 
looking at this wall and you acquired the power of X-ray VlSlon you 
would see the far wall of the next room, as you can when I open this 
door. Now, if after looking again at the wall in front of you you were 
to go through the door into the next room and turned 180 degrees you 
would be facing the near wall of the next room or the opposite side of 
·this wall. Thus when looking at a wall it is possible for you to de-
termine what we will call the reverse view, the X-ray view, and the 
opposite view. 
AT THIS POINT THE EXPERIMENTER SHOULD QUESTION THE SUBJECT TO MAKE 
SURE HE UNDERSTANDS THE THREE TASKS. IF HE INDICATES THAT HE DOES, THE 
E SHOULD LAY ALL OF THE WALL PHOTOGRAPHS BEFORE THE SUBJECT. FROM AN-
OTHER DECK OF PHOTOGRAPHS THE E SHOULD PRESENT ONE AT A TIME, EACH TIME 
ASKING FOR ONE OF THE THREE VIEWS. THE SUBJECT SHOULD PICK UP THE AP-
PRIATE PHOTOGRAPH FROM THOSE IN FRONT OF HIM. ERRORS SHOULD BE RE-
CORDED. IF A SUBJECT CANNOT CHOOSE CORRECTLY AFTER ONE ERROR, OR IF 
HE MAKES MORE THAN THREE INITIAL ERRORS, THEN THE VIEWS SHOULD BE EX-
PLAINED AGAIN. IF THE SUBJECT STILL CANNOT ACHIEVE CRITERION, HE 
SHOULD BE RETURNED TO PHASE 3. 
Phase 5 (Pamiliarization with 
Task Sequence) 
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"When one of the task lights before you lights up, you are free to 
begin. When you are ready you will depress one of the two handswitches 
on either side of the control switch in either direction 1n front of 
your chair (E points) at which point a slide will appear on the screen 
in front of you. As long as you hold the handswitch down, the slide 
will remain on the screen. You are then to determine the point of view 
indicated by the stimulus light given that you are looking at the slide 
on the screen. When you feel that you know what the appropriate view 
is, you quickly remove your hand from the switch. At this point the 
slide will disappear from the screen and another slide will appear in 
its place. This second slide will either be the correct view or it 
will be another incorrect view. If it 1s the correct view, you should 
throw the central hand switch in front of you in the direction indi-
cated by the word "yes." If it is the incorrect view you should throw 
the switch in the direction indicated by the word "no." In either case, 
after you throw the switch, the second slide will disappear from the 
screen. After about one-half second one of the stimulus lights will 
light up again and you will be free to begin the process again. 
Also intermixed with the views will be a few trials where the task 
will be to decide if the second slide 1s the same exact slide as the 
first slide. If it 1s, you will decide "yes," and if it is not, you 
will respond "no." These trials will be indicated by a stimulus light 
marked "identity." The lights marked "correct" and "incorrect" will 
inform you if your decision was correct. 
APPENDIX C 
MEAN ERRORS MADE IN LEARNING PHASES 
1 3 3 4 
1 
Task/ Task/ 
Directions Furniture Diagram Pictures 
Mean Yes - 26 5.25 .94 • 56 
s. E. No - 6 3.84 2.20 1. 54 





AOV FOR REACTION TIME 1 
Source df ss MS F 
Sex (X) 1 4.2313 4.2313 0.5340 
Task (T) 2 3.0399 1. 5200 4.2386* 
Day (D) 1 46.4528 46.4528 84.0553** 
Session [S(D)] 2 24.6987 12.3493 70.2335** 
Subjects (N(X)) 30 237.7307 7.9244 
X * T 2 1. 4874 .7437 2.0739 
X '" D 1 .2871 .2871 .5195 
X,,. S(D) 2 1. 3141 .6570 3.7367* 
T * D 2 .3037 .1519 2.6384 
T * S(D) 4 .6117 .1529 1.904 
T ,., N(X) 60 21. 5160 .3586 
D * N(X) 30 16.5734 .5526 
s * N(DX) 60 10.5500 .1758 
X * T * D 2 .0323 .0163 .2801 
X '" T * S(D) 4 .2015 .0504 .6270 
T 1< D * N(X) 60 3.4538 .0576 





MEANS FOR RTl AND RT2 OVER SESSIONS AND TASKS 
I ,II III IV Total 
RTl (Sec) 
X 3.163 2.594 2.267 1. 961 2.496 
Heverse 
S.E.= .972 .949 .836 .750 .829 
X = 3.304 2.649 2.538 2.161 2.663 
X-ray 
S.E.= .948 .853 .937 .813 .833 
Opposite 
X 3.319 2.779 2.629 2.079 2.702 
S.E.= 1.090 .988 .923 .789 .871 
Identity 
X 1.034 .847 .730 .670 .820 
S.E.= .346 .338 .217 .177 .233 
-- -- --- - - - --
RT2 (Sec) 
Reverse 
X 1.317 1.099 .968 .867 1.063 
S.E.= .329 .313 .256 .219 .255 
X = 1.366 1.085 1.005 .866 1.080 X-ray 
S.E.= .355 .262 .256 .217 .246 
Opposite 
X = 1.333 1.183 1.033 .920 1.117 
S.E.= .369 .307 .252 .254 .265 
Identity 
X 1.012 .795 .714 .670 .798 
S.E.= .260 .176 .158 .160 .175 
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APPENDIX F 
AOV FOR REACTION TIME 2 
Source df ss MS F 
Sex (X) 1 .3944343 .3944 .5145 
Task (T) 2 .1986 .0993 7. 3535~' 
Day (D) 1 7.9348 7.9348 89.5300** 
Session [S(D)] 2 2.9166 1. 4583 53 • 0145~dc 
Subjects [N(X)] 30 22.9995 .76665 
X ,~ T 2 .0354 .01769 1. 3095 
X,., D 1 .2599 .2599 2.9329 
X,., S(D) 2 .0476 .0238 .8648 
T ,~ D 2 .0018 .0091 .0899 
T ~' S(D) 4 .1492 .0373 4. 4925~' 
T * N(X) 60 .8103 .0135 
D '~ N(X) 30 2.659 .0886 
s '~ N( DX) 60 1.650 .0275 
X,., T ~' D 2 .0095 .0047 .4675 
X 1< T ~' S(D) 4 .0548 .0137 1. 6494 
T ~' D '~ N(X) 60 .6071 .0101 





RT CUTOFF VALUES 
(Sec. ) 
Task 
R, x, 0 I 
RTl Maximum 5.50 2.50 Minimum .80 .30 
RT2 Maximum 3.50 2.50 Minimum . 50 .30 
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APPENDIX H 
RT TASK ERRORS 
(16 per cell possible) 
l 2 3 4 Total 
Identity 
X = .531 .219 .188 .094 .258 
S.E.= .761 .491 .739 .390 .595 
X = 2.063 l. 750 1.844 1.031 1.672 Reverse 
S.E.= 2.078 l. 741 1.851 1.257 l. 780 
X = l. 750 1.313 1.250 1.156 l. 367 X-ray s;E.= 1.481 1.256 1.320 1.273 1. 335 
Opposite X = 2.406 1. 313 1.688 1.344 1.672 
S.E.= 1.847 1.306 1.424 1.125 1.426 
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APPENDIX I 
AOV FOR ERRORS 
Source df ss MS F 
Sex (X) 1 17.5104 17.5104 1.4432 
Task (T) 2 7.9375 3.9687 1. 5556 
Day (D) 1 13.5000 13.5000 7.2537* 
Session [S(D)] 2 26.0521 13.0260 14. 5351*·~ 
Subjects [N(X)] 30 363.9790 12.1326 
X ,., T 2 2.1458 1.0729 .4205 
X * D 1 .1667 .1667 .0896 
X ,~ S(D) 2 .1771 .0885 .0988 
T ·;. D 2 .4375 .2187 .1611 
T ·~ S(D) 4 10.2291 2.5573 2.3257 
T * N(X) 60 153.0805 2.5513 
D ·~ N(X) 30 55.8333 1. 8611 
S * N(DS) 60 53.7708 .8962 
X 1' T .~ D 2 1.5833 .7916 .5830 
X ·l-: T ~·-. S(D) 4 3.7916 .9479 .8621 
T 1' D '~' N(X) 60 81.4695 1.358 
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